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Abstract. With the rapid advancement of wireless network technology, usage 
of WSN in real time applications like military, forest monitoring etc. found 
increasing. Generally WSN operate in an unattended environment and handles 
critical data. Authenticating the user trying to access the sensor memory is one 
of the critical requirements. Many researchers have proposed remote user 
authentication schemes focusing on various parameters. In 2013, Li et al. 
proposed a temporal-credential-based mutual authentication and key agreement 
scheme for WSNs. Li et al. claimed that their scheme is secure against all major 
cryptographic attacks and requires less computation cost due to usage of hash 
function instead encryption operations. Unfortunately, in this paper we will 
show that their scheme is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack, stolen 
smart card attack, leakage of password etc. and failure to provide data privacy. 
Keywords: Wireless Sesnor Network, Cryptanalysis, key agreement; 
mutual authentication; temporal credential.  
1   Introduction 
Most of the real time applications in which WSN are deployed are data driven. The 
nodes need to sense and monitor various physical conditions like temperature, human 
presence etc. The data stored in these sensors are accessed through public channel 
Internet from remote areas. Hence authenticating the remote users trying to access the 
sensor data is more important. Many researchers have contributed into these 
literatures.  
In 2013, Xue et al. proposed a temporal-credential-based mutual authentication and 
key agreement scheme which is secure and light weight. In 2013 Li et al. 
cryptanalyzed and shown that Xue at al. scheme is vulnerable to offline password 
guessing attack and proposed an improved version. Unfortunately, Li et al. scheme 
also suffers from offline and smart card lost attacks. In this paper we will show the 
drawbacks of Li et al. scheme. 
2   Review of C.T Li et al. scheme 
In this section, we examine the Li et al. [2] An Advanced Temporal Credential-
Based Security Scheme with Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement for Wireless 
Sensor Networks. Li et al.  Scheme is divided into the five phases of pre-registration, 
registration, login, mutual verification and session key agreement phases. The 
notations used in Li et al. scheme are listed below: 
Ui:  ith User. 
Sj:  jth Sensor node. 
IDi, PWi: Identity and Password pair of user Ui 
SIDj, PWj:  Pre-configured identity and password pair of the sensor node Sj 
GWN: Gateway node 
KGWN_U/KGWN_S : Two private system parameters only know to GWN. 
TCi, TCj:  A temporal credential issued by GWN to Ui/Sj 
TS: The timestamp value. 
TEi : The expiration time of Ui’s temporal credential. 
SC: Smart card 
h(·):  A secure one-way hash function. 
A⊕B: Bit wise Exclusive OR (XOR) operation of A and B. 
A||B: Bit wise concatenation of A and B. 
4.1. Pre-Registration Phase  
Before registration GWN pre configures each user Ui with a pair of identity IDi
pre
 and 
password PWi
pre
 . GWN stores h(IDi
pre
||PWi
pre
), IDi
pre
 in its database. Similarly each 
sensor Sj will be pre-configured with its identity SIDj and a 160-bits random number 
rj and the value h(SIDj||rj), Each Sj has a pre-configured identity SIDj and a 160-bits 
random number rj and the hash value of Sj’s pre-configured identity and random 
number h(SIDj||rj) and SIDj are stored on the GWN’s side. 
4.2. Registration Phase: 
This phase has two parts for Ui and Sj and the details will be described as follows: 
Ui selects his/her own IDi and password PWi. Then Ui computes VIi = 
h(TS1||H(IDi
pre
||PWi
pre
)), CIi=h(IDi
pre
||PWi
pre
)⊕h(IDi||PWi||ri), DIi = IDi⊕h 
(IDi
pre
||PWi
pre
) and sends {IDi
pre
, TS1, VIi, CIi, DIi} to GWN via an open and public 
channel, where TS1 is current timestamp value of Ui and ri is a random number 
generated by Ui. 
(U-2) After receiving the registration request from Ui, GWN checks if |TS1－T
*
GWN 
| < △T, where T*GWN is the current system timestamp of GWN and △T is the 
expected time interval for the transmission delay. If it does not hold, GWN sends REJ 
message back to Ui. Otherwise, GWN retrieves its own copy of h(IDi
pre
||PWi
pre
) by 
using the parameter “IDi
pre”, computes VIi
*
 = h(TS1|| h(IDi
pre
||PWi
pre
)) and checks if 
VIi
*
 = VIi. If not, GWN terminates it; otherwise, GWN computes 
Qi=CIi⊕h(IDi
pre
||PWi
pre
) = h(IDi||PWi||ri), IDi = DIi⊕H(IDi
pre
||PWi
pre
), Pi = h (IDi || 
TEi), TCi = h(KGWN_U||Pi||TEi) and PTCi = TCi⊕Qi and personalizes the smart card 
for Ui with the parameters:{h(•), h(Qi), TEi, PTCi}. GWN maintains a write protected 
file, where the Status-bit indicates the status of the user, i.e., when Ui is logged-in to 
GWN, the status-bit is set to one, otherwise it is set to zero. Finally, GWN sends h(Qi) 
and smart card to Ui via an public and open environment. 
(U-3) After receiving h(Qi) and smart card from GWN, Ui checks whether the 
computed h(h(IDi||PWi||ri)) is equal to h(Qi). If they are not equal, Ui aborts this 
session and the smart card. Otherwise, GWN is authenticated by Ui. Ui enters ri into 
his/her smart card and Ui’s smart card contains {h(•), h(Qi), TEi, PTCi, ri}.  
Registration Phase of a Sensor 
(S-1) Sj computes VIj = h(TS2||h(SIDj||rj)) and sends {SIDj, TS2, VIj} to GWN via 
an open and public channel, where TS2 is current timestamp value of Sj. 
(S-2) After receiving the message from Sj, GWN checks if |TS2－T*GWN | < △T, 
where T
*
GWN is the current system timestamp of GWN and △T is the expected time 
interval for the transmission delay. If it does not hold, GWN sends REJ message back 
to Sj. Otherwise, GWN retrieves its own copy of h(SIDj||rj) by using the key “SIDj”, 
computes VIj
*
 = h(TS2||h(SIDj||rj)) and checks if VIj
*
 = VIj. If not, GWN terminates it; 
otherwise, GWN computes TCj = h(KGWN_S||SIDj), Qj = h(TS3||h(SIDj||rj)) and REGj = 
h(h(SIDj||rj) ||TS3)⊕TCj and sends {TS3, Qj, REGj} to Sj. 
S-3) After receiving the message from GWN, Sj checks if |TS3－Tj
*
| < △T, where 
Tj
*
 is the current timestamp value of Sj. If not, Sj terminates it. Otherwise, Sj checks 
whether the computed h(TS3||h(SIDj||rj) is equal to Qj. If they are equal, Sj computes 
its temporal credential TCj = REGj⊕h(h(SIDj)||rj||TS3) and stores it. Note that Sj does 
not need to store rj after finishing the phase. 
Login and Authentication Phase 
(A-1) Ui computes DIDi = IDi⊕h(TCi||TS4), Ci = h(h(IDi||PWi||ri)||TS4)⊕TCi) and 
PKSi = Ki⊕h(TCi||TS4||”000”) and h(TCi||TS4). 
(A-2) After receiving the message from Ui, GWN checks the validity of TS4. If 
TS4 is valid for the transmission delay, GWN computes TCi* = h(KGWN_U||Pi||TEi) and 
IDi = DIDi⊕h(TCi
*
||TS4) and retrieves Ui’s password-verifier of Qi =  
 
The above table taken from Li et al scheme [2]. 
 
h(IDi||PWi||ri) by using the parameter ”IDi”. Then, GWN further computes Ci* = 
h(h(Qi||TS4)⊕TCi) and verifies whether Ci
*
 = C
i
. If it does not hold, GWN rejects 
Ui’s login request; otherwise, the status-bit is set to one and TS4 is recorded in the 4th 
field of the identity table to demonstrate Ui’s last login. GWN computes Ki = 
PKSi⊕h(TCi||TS4||”000”) and chooses a nearby suitable sensor node Sj as the 
accessed sensor node. GWN further computes Sj’s temporal credential TCj = 
h(KGWN_S||SIDj), DIDGWN = IDi⊕h(DIDi||TCj||TS5), CGWN = h(IDi||TCi||TS5) and 
PKSGWN = Ki⊕h(TCj||TS5) and sends {TS5, DIDi, DIDGWN, CGWN, PKSGWN} to Sj, 
where TS5 is current timestamp value of GWN. 
(A-3) After receiving the message from GWN, Sj checks the validity of TS5. If TS5 is 
valid for the transmission delay, Sj computes IDi = DIDGWN⊕h(DIDi||TCj||TS5) and 
C
*
GWN = h(IDi||TCj||TS5) and check if C
*
GWN = CGWN. If not, Sj terminates this session. 
Else, Sj convinces that the received message is from a legitimate GWN. Moreover, Sj 
computes Ki = PKSGWN⊕h(TCj||TS5), Cj = h(Kj||IDi||SIDi||TS6) and PKSj = Kj ⊕ h 
(Ki||TS6) and sends{SIDj, TS6, Cj, PKSj} to Ui and GWN.  
(A-4) After receiving the message from Sj, Ui and GWN separately computes Kj = 
PKSj⊕h(Ki||TS6) and Cj
*
 = h(Kj||IDi||SIDj||TS6). For GWN, if Cj
*
 = Cj, Sj is 
authenticated by GWN. For the user Ui, if Cj
*
 = Cj, Sj and GWN are authenticated by 
Ui. Finally, Ui and Sj can separately compute a common session key KEYij = 
h(Ki⊕Kj) and Ui and Sj will use KEYij for securing communications in future. 
Cryptanalysis and Security Pitfalls of the C.T Li et al scheme  
C.T Li cryptanalyzed recently proposed Xue et al.’s temporal-credential based 
mutual authentication scheme and proposed an improved scheme and claimed that 
their scheme requires less computation cost due to usage of  lightweight one-way hash 
function and resists various cryptographic attacks like stolen verifier attacks, insider 
attacks, lost smart card attack and many logged-in users attack, etc. Unfortunately, In 
this paper we will show that the Li et al. scheme fails to resist all the attacks they 
claimed that their scheme resists and also the legal adversary can find out the 
password of the legal user.  
Offline Password Guessing Attack Coupled with Lost Smart Card 
Problem  
Researchers [3,4] have shown that using various techniques like power 
consumption (The amount of power consumed by a microprocessor varies for 
operations like AES, DES, where as it is less for hash etc. ) analysis, Electromagnetic  
radiation, Timing etc. Many researchers including Li et al. [2] have cryptanalyzed the 
authentication schemes based on the above assumption.  (Assumption that a smart 
card even though it is a tamper resistant, the data stored in its memory can be read 
out.) 
 
In step (U-1) of registration phase of  Li et al.’s scheme, Ui sends{IDi
pre
, TS1, VIi, CIi, 
DIi} to GWN via an open and public environment, where TS1 is current time stamp 
value of Ui  and  VIi = h(TS1||H(IDi
pre
||PWi
pre
)), CIi =h (IDi
pre 
|| PWi 
pre 
) ⊕ h 
(IDi||PWi||ri), DIi = IDi⊕h (IDi
pre
||PWi
pre
) .  If  an adversary UA intercepts the  Ui’s 
registration message { IDi
pre
, TS1, VIi, CIi, DIi}, by eavesdropping into the 
communication channel, UA can  launch the off-line password guessing attack as 
follows: 
Step 1: UA guesses a password PWi
pre*
 and computes VIi
*
 = h( TS1 || h (IDi
pre 
|| PWi 
pre* 
) ), 
Step 2: UA compares the result of VIi* with eavesdropped VIi. 
A match in Step 2 above indicates the PWi
pre
  assigned by GWN to Ui is PWi
pre
*.  On 
getting PWi
pre
* ,  The adversary knows  IDi
pre
,  PWi 
pre*
.  
Step 3) Ui smart card contains the values  {h(•), h(Qi), TEi, PTCi, ri}.  If  UA stolen the 
smart card of Ui for a while , UA can perform following operations. 
Step4) :    DIi⊕h (IDi
pre
||PWi
pre
) = IDi  
Step 5):  CIi ⊕h (IDi
pre 
|| PWi 
pre 
) =  h (IDi||PWi||ri) 
Step 6): UA can guess a password PWi* and computes h (IDi||PWi
*
 ||ri) and compares 
the result with DIi⊕h (IDi
pre
||PWi
pre
).  If both are equal then the Ui correct password is 
PWi
*
.  On getting Ui IDi and PWi the adversary UA can perform all major 
cryptographic attacks and can able to frame the session key also. 
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